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Brief of Appellant
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County,
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Judge.
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MARY PARKER, Administratix
of the estate of Katie C. Johnson, etc.
deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 7401

vs.
S. R. ROSS and EDITH ROSS, his wife,
et al.
Defendants and Respondents
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant appeals from an order and judgment entered
by the district court of Salt Lake County, Utah, dismissing
appellant's complaint with prejudice and upon the merits
thereof. (R. 45).
It is shown by the allegations of appellant's complaint
that Katie C. Johnson was the owner of the fee title to the
real property affected by this action. That the property was
sold for general property taxes for the year 1924 and that
Auditor's Deed issued thereon in 1929. That thereafter Salt
Lake County issued a quitclaim deed covering said property
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to one, Alton F. Lund who thereafter on January 7, 1946
conveyed the property to defendants and respondents S. R.
Ross and Edith Ross, his wife. That S. R. Ross and Edith
Ross, his wife filed quiet title action in the district court of
Salt Lake County, Utah, naming Katie C. Johnson as defendant in said action. That service of process was had on
Katie C. Johnson in said action by publication and decree
quieting title in S. R. Ross and Edith Ross, his wife, was
entered upon the default of Katie C. Johnson, on June 13th,
1946.
By appellant's second amended complaint, appellant
adopted and made a part of her second amended complaint,
the affidavit upon which the orded for publication of summons was predicated ( R. 34) which affidavit is attached to
and made a part of appellant's first amended complaint
(R. 20, 21, 22) by which it is evident that said action to
quiet title was not filed until the year 1946.
Appellant, by her complaint alleges the fact that Katie
C. Johnson died at Deer Lodge, Montana, during the month
of August, 1919, leaving as her only heir at law, Alice
Larson.
This action is brought for the purpose of setting aside
the judgment and decree quieting title to the property affected by this action in Respondents Ross. Appellant pro·
ceeds as administratrix of the estate of Katie C. Johnson,
deceased (R. 35). Appellant further alleges that the tax
title, upon which the judgment and decree quieting title in
respondents to the property affected by this action, was
defective in that no auditor's affidavit was attached to the
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assessment rolls and therefore the estate of Katie C.
Johnson, deceased had a meritorious defense to said action
(R. 36).
Respondents filed general and special demurrers to
appellant's second complaint together with a motion w
strike portions of appellant's complaint. The court sustained respondents' general demurrer, also the special demurrer
to that part of paragraph 5 of the complaint reading as
follows:

a

•

II:

:rr:

"That the periodical in which said summons was published, the South Salt Lake Herald was not a newspaper having general circulation in Salt Lake County,
and the same is a periodical least likely to give notice
to defendant in said action and to the parties interested
therein and not a periodical most likely to give notice
of such action." ( R. 35) ( R. 42)
and to appellant's paragraph 7, (R. 36 and 42).
The court further granted respondents' motion to strike
from paragraph 6 of the complaint, the following:
"That plaintiff herein, through her agent, in using due
diligence and in endeavoring to determine the where·
abouts of Katie C. Johnson, the defendant in said action,
made inquiry at the office of the City Police Department
of Butte, Montana, the city in which said Katie C.
1ohnson resided for many years prior to her death,
and the city shown by the records of Salt Lake County,
Utah, in which said party resided and the city in which
Mrs. R. E. Larson, the daughter of said Katie C. Johnson
resided, the tax rolls of Salt Lake County reflecting the
address of Katie C. Johnson as being in care of Mr. R. E.
Larson, 702a West Park, Butte, Montana." (R. 35 and
42)
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II.
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS

Comes now the appellant and says that there is manifest error in the records, proceedings and judgment entered
in this cause in this, to-wit:

( l) The court erred in sustaining respondents' general
demurrer to appellant's complaint (R. 42), for the reason
that said complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action agaist respondents and each of them.
( 2) The court erred in sustaining resopndents' special
demurrer, part II ( R. 38 & 42), for the reason that the
allegations therein contained state with particularity the
manner in which and the particulars claimed that the South
Salt Lake Herald is not a newspaper having a general
circulation in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
( 3) The court erred in sustaining respondents' special
demurrer, par. III (R. 38 & 42) for the reason that it is
not required that appellant state what the contents of the
mail therein referred to was or when same was mailed, this
inasmuch as appellant alleges the mail to have been that
mailed by respondents and the contents and time of mailing were within the knowledge of respondents.
( 4) The court erred in granting respondents' motion to
strike the allegations contained in the first nine lines of
par. 6 of appellant's complaint and also the word "Montana"
contained in line 10 of said par. 6 (R. 35 & 42), for the
reason that said allegations expressly show why and where-
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in respondents failed to use due diligence In ascertaining
the whereabouts of Katie C. Johnson.

III.
ARGUMENT

There being no bill of exceptions in this case, no trial
having been had, and inasmuch as appellant's argument
applies to each specification of error the specifications of
error will not be separately argued.
This action is a direct attack on the original judgment
and not a collateral attack thereon. It is a suit in equity to
have the original judgment declared null and void.
The instant case does not come within that line of
cases which are predicated on nonresidence of the defendant.
Had defendent been living at the time process was attempted
to be served, then we would have an entirely different case.
Here we have a case in which process was attempted to be
served against a deceased person. There is no statute in this
state which permits process against a deceased person but
on the contrary, the legislature of this state has made provision for proceeding in an action for the recovery of possession of property against executors or administrators in
all cases in which the same might have been maintained by
or against their respective testators or intestates. (Sec. 102ll-5 UOA 1943).
We say that due diligence was not exercised in the action
through which title was decreed to be in respondents. Neither were the statutory requirements met by respondents in
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that action in which default judgment was entered through
publication of summons.
It is clearly evident that the agent for respondents in
the quiet title action made a useless search of records in
Salt Lake County, Utah, as is stated was done, when it was
evident from the source of inquiry that Katie C. Johnson
was not and had not been a resident of Salt Lake County,
Utah. Such inquiry as it appears was made, was on its
face useless and would avail respondents nothing whatsoever
other than to avoid acquiring actual knowledge of the fact
that Katie C. Johnson was, at the time, deceased.
Respondents did not use due dilligence in their efforts
to locate Katie C. Johnson; that is, not the diligence contemplated by the Legislature in enacting the law on this subject.
Due diligence could only have been shown by doing that
which appellant did in determining the fact that Katie C.
Johnson was deceased. The court never did obtain juri:5diction of Katie C. Johnson, or her representatives or heirs.
That which respondents did in endeavoring to locate Katie
C. Johnson did not meet the intent and spirit of the law.
The Utah court has said in the case of Liebhart v.
Lawrence, 40 Utah, 243 (259) that the law abhors and forbids the taking of property from a person without notice and
without his day in court.
In the Liebhart case supra. the court further say~ at
page 261:
"Non residents, as well as residents have a right to
acquire and hold property in this state. In the absence
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of proof of actual service, proceedings affecting their
property require careful scrutiny; and the court, before
entering a judgment taking it from them and giving it
to another, should see to it that not only one, but that
every requirement of the statute providing for a constructive service has, both in letter and spirit been strictly complied with. The spirit and intent of the statute
is .to give the non resident notice of the proceedings
against or affecting his property, if that can be done."
(Italics added).
It is clearly evident from the language used in the
above cited case, that the statute has not been complied with
in letter and spirit simply by determining that the defendant
was not a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. The respondents were required to go further and to be diligent in makmg their inquiries.
In this argument, appellant is not unmindful of the fact
that a distinction can be made in the facts of the Liebhart
case and in those in the instant case to a certain extent. In
the Liebhart case copies of the summons and complaint were
not mailed nor attempted to be mailed by the plaintiff whereas in the instant case mail was directed to Katie C. Johnson by
the agent of respondents although it is not evident at this
time whether the mail contained a copy of the summons and
complaint or something else. Even if copies of the summons
and complaint were enclosed the following dicta found in the
Liebhart case at page 261 might be and we think will be
applied in this case:
"Here comes a litigant into court by a proceeding affecting the property of a nonresident who for many
years had the record title, except as his rights thereto
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may have been divested by the tax sale, and seeks to take
it from him, and to claim it for himself. He causes an
affidavit to be filed by an agent that the nonresident
'resides out of the State of Utah, and that his place of
residence is to the affiant unknown,' without even stating that the place of such residence is unknown to the
litigant. The clerk manifests no concern about it, and on
the affidavit alone directs and causes the summons to
be published, not in a 'newspaper designated as most
likely to give notice to the person to be served', but in
a weekly periodical least likely to give such notice. No
effort and no inquiry is made to ascertain or to discover
the place of plaintiff's residence. The fact of the place
of residence was regarded as wholly immaterial, and
that all that was necessary to know was that the plaintiff
was a nonresident."

It is to be noted that in the instant case neither the
litigant nor his agent stated in the affidavit upon which the
order for publication of summons was based that the place
of residence of Katie C. Johnson is unknown to affiant or to
the litigant.
It is evident in the instant case as in the Liebhart
case supra, the fact of the place of residence, and we might
here add, whether defendant Katie C. Johnson was living
or dead, was regarded as wholly immaterial, and that all
that was necessary to know was that the defendant, Katie C.
Johnson was a nonresident.
The affidavit upon which the order for publication was
made in the instant case does no more than to repeat the
language or substance of the statute. This is not sufficient.
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Said the court in the case of Ricketson v. Richardson, 26
Cal. 149, cited by the Utah court in the Liebhart case: ,
'"An affidavit which merely repeats the language or
substance of the statute is not sufficient. To hold that
a bald repetition of the statute is sufficient is to strip
the court or judge to whom the application is made of
all judicial functions, and allow the party himself to
determine in his own way the existence of jurisdictional
facts-a practice too dangerous to the rights of de·
fendants to admit of judicial toleration."
It has further been held that an affidavit has no pro·
bative force or evidentiary value when given by one who
does not purport to have any knowledge of the fact deposed,
either from _personal knowledge or from inquiry or investigation. Such an affidavit is defective and is open to direct
attack.
See Liebhart v. Lawrence, supra.
Bothell v. Hoellwarth, 10 S.D. 491, 74 N.W. 231,
Nicoll v. Midland Svgs. L. Co. 21 Okla. 591, 96 Pac.

744;
McLaughlin v. McCann, 123 App. Div. 67, 107 N. Y.
Supp. 762;
Thompson v. Circuit Judge, 54 Mich. 236, 19 N. W.
967;
Mackubin v. Smith, 5 Minn. 367;
Alderson v. Marshall, 7 Mont. 288, 16 Pae. 576;
Noble v. Aune, 50 Wash. 73, 96 Pac. 688.
We ask, what knowledge did affiant expect to acquire, what knowledge could affiant acquire by making
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